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STATE V. FLORES. IN THE WAKE OF ATKINS V.
VIRGINIA, NEW MEXICO TACKLES CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT FOR DEFENDANTS WITH
MENTAL DISABILITIES
ALETHEIA V.P. ALLEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The thought of imposing the death penalty on a person with mental retardation
may seem archaic and uncivilized to the modem person. However, not too long ago
executing defendants with mental retardation was permitted and practiced. The U.S.
Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether defendants with mental
retardation can be subject to capital punishment in the 1989 landmark case, Penry
v. Lynaugh,' where the Court held that there was not sufficient national consensus
to prohibit the execution of defendants with mental retardation.' Shortly thereafter,
in 1991, the New Mexico legislature became one of the first state legislatures to
adopt a statute that prohibited the execution of defendants with mental retardation.3
Not until 2002, eleven years after New Mexico enacted the relevant section to the
Criminal Felony Sentencing Act,4 did the U.S. Supreme Court revisit this issue in
Atkins v. Virginia.5 Atkins overruled Penry regarding the constitutionality of
executing defendants with mental retardation, stating that in light of "evolving
standards of decency," the execution of defendants with mental retardation must be
constitutionally prohibited.6 However, Atkins left the states with the power to
establish procedures to implement the mandate.7
In 2004, the New Mexico Supreme Court was confronted with the question of
whether section 31-20A-2.1 of the Criminal Felony Sentencing Act,' describing the
procedures for implementing the State's prohibition against executing individuals
with mental retardation, was unconstitutional given the holding in Atkins.9 The
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1. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruledin part by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see infraPart H.A.
2. Penry, 492 U.S. at 304.
3. NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1 (1991); see infra Part ll.B. New Mexico was actually the fifth state to pass
such a law. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314 (2002). The first four states to pass a law prohibiting execution
of defendants with mental retardation were Georgia, Maryland, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Id. at 314 nn.9, 11-12
(citingGA. CODEANN. § 17-7-131(j) (2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130, 532.135,532.140 (Banks-Baldwin
2003); MD. CODE ANN., Criminal Law § 2-202(b) (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2003)).
4. NMSA 1978, §§ 31-20A-1 to -6 (1991).
5. 536 U.S. 304; see infra Part ll.D.
6. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)).
7. Id.at 317. The Court in Atkins echoed its earlier instructions in Ford,477 U.S. at 416, wherein it left
to the states the power to determine procedures for implementing the prohibition on the execution of defendants
with mental illnesses. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
8. NMSA 1978, §§ 31-20A-1 to -6 (1991).
9. The constitutionality of the statute was challenged in State v. Flores,2004-NMSC-02 1, 93 P.3d 1264,
on the grounds that it did not require a jury to find the issue of a lack of mental retardation beyond a reasonable
doubt because it did not treat the lack of mental retardation as an aggravating factor that served to increase the
penalty permitted to capital punishment. See infra Parts II.B, IV.
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court, in State v. Flores," decided that the statute was not unconstitutional as
written." This Note will discuss the historical background leading up to the New
Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Flores, foreshadowing the basis for the court's
reasoning. 2 The Note will briefly describe the statement of the case and the facts
3 The Note will then cover the court's rationale
the court addressed in Flores.1
and
an analysis thereof. The Note will argue that, although the result the court came to
could be seen as limited, it was correct in its application of case law and the
relevant statute.' 4 Finally, the Note will discuss the implications that Flores will
have in New Mexico, offering suggestions for future legislative and judicial actions
regarding capital punishment. 5
I. BACKGROUND
The issue of whether defendants with mental retardation can be subject to the
death penalty has recently surfaced in American jurisprudence. Although
defendants with mental retardation have generally been exempted from capital
punishment,' 6 it was not until 1986 that the issue received national attention in this
country.' 7 The case that brought this issue to the forefront of legal attention arose
in Georgia with the proposed execution of a defendant with mental retardation,
Jerome Bowden. 8 There, "[t]he state Board of Pardons and Paroles had suspended
[the pending] execution just mere hours before it was to take place," as a result of
public protests.' 9 The Board allowed for a clinical evaluation that showed that
Bowden had mental retardation.20 In spite of the evaluation, the Board removed the
suspension, and Bowden was executed.2 The State of Georgia responded to these
actions, and the public disgust thereof, by being the first state to enact a statute
prohibiting capital punishment of defendants with mental retardation.22 The U.S.
Supreme Court did not address the issue until 1989 in Penry v. Lynaugh.23
The Supreme Court decided four cases that lead a national discussion on the
issue of execution of defendants with mental retardation: Penry,24 Apprendi v. New

10. 2004-NMSC-021, 93 P.3d 1264.
11. See id. 3, 93 P.3d at 1266.
12. See infra Part 1H.
13. See infra Part M.
14. See infra Parts IV, V.
15. See infra Part VI.
16. Victor L. Streib, Adolescence, Mental Retardation,and the Death Penalty: The Siren Call of Atkins
v. Virginia, 33 N.M. L. REV. 183, 194 (2003).
17. James W. Ellis, DisabilityAdvocacy and the Death Penalty: The Roadfrom Penryto Atkins, 33 N.M.
L. REv. 173, 173 (2003).

18. Id.
19. Associated Press, RetardedKiller Dies in GeorgiaChair,CHI. TRIB., June 25, 1986; see Ellis, supra
note 17, at 173.
20. Ellis, supra note 17, at 173.

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.; GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-1310) (2004).
492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruledin part by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id.
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Jersey,25 Atkins v. Virginia,26 and Ring v. Arizona.27 Most illustrative is the Court's
recent decision in Atkins, wherein it held that executing defendants with mental
retardation is impermissible under the Eighth Amendment 28 prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. 29 These four U.S. Supreme Court cases, taken in
conjunction with the relevant portion of New Mexico's Capital Felony Sentencing
Act,30 form the framework from which State v. Flores3 was decided. A
chronological evaluation of these authorities assists in gaining a more complete
understanding of Flores.
A. Penry v. Lynaugh
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Penry that'the existence of mental
retardation,12 in and of itself, does not preclude imposition of the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment.O3 In Penry, the jury found the defendant competent
to stand trial, in spite of testimony that he had been diagnosed with mental
retardation from organic brain damage as a child. 4 As a result, the defendant then
raised an insanity defense, which the jury also rejected, finding him guilty of capital
murder.3 The Court examined two issues in Penry: (1) whether a death sentence
was imposed in violation of the Eighth Amendment "because the jury was not
instructed" to consider "mitigating evidence in imposing its sentence,"36 and (2)
whether "the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits" the death penalty in cases
where the defendant has mental retardation.37
1. Timing of the Consideration of Mitigating Evidence
The first issue in Penrywas whether the defendant's death sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment because the court did not instruct the jury to consider mitigating
factors.38 The jury was told it could consider the mitigating factors only in the

25. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
26. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
27. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VILI.
29. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
30. NMSA 1978, §§ 31-20A-1 to-6 (1991).
31. 2004-NMSC-021, 93 P.3d 1264.
32. The definition of mental retardation used in Penry was based upon the old common law notion of
"idiocy"--encompassing a "permanent, congenital mental deficiency." Penry, 492 U.S. at 332. However, the
common law definition of "idiot" corresponds with what we currently consider to be "profound" and "severe"
retardation, correlating with an intelligence quotient of 25 or lower. Id. at 333. But see infra note 72 and
accompanying text.
33. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 335.
34. Id. at 307-08.
35. Id. at 308, 310.
36. Id. at 307.
37. Id.
38. Id. Mitigating factors, as used in the death penalty context, are those factors that the sentencer can use
to decrease the sentence imposed. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,593-94 (2002). Common examples of mitigating
circumstances are a defendant's "'minimal' criminal record" or "[t]he defendant's capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct." ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(1) (West 2001). Generally, the phrase
"mitigating factor" has two applications: it offers discretion to the sentencer to decrease sentence imposed, and it
gives conclusive mitigating effect in instances where its presence automatically reduces the sentence.
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context of answering the special questions presented to it.39 The Court in Penry held
that the jury must be allowed to consider and give effect to the question of the
defendant's mental retardation as mitigating evidence.4 0 However, the Court further
stated that the fact that the jury was not permitted to give conclusive mitigating
effect to the issue of mental retardation did not violate the Eighth Amendment
sanction on cruel and unusual punishment. The Court's rationale behind this
holding was that the sentencers could still make individualized determinations
because they could "consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of mental
retardation."' Thus, the Court in Penry held that, although the presence of mental
retardation in a defendant does not automatically preclude capital punishment, it
must be considered by the jury in some manner.
2. Eighth Amendment Consideration of Executing Individuals with Mental
Retardation
The Court in Penry then addressed the broader issue of whether "it would be
cruel and unusual punishment, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, to execute a
mentally retarded person. 4 2 The Court addressed this issue by expounding on the
historical treatment of "idiots" in the law and then relating that discussion to present
day mental retardation.43
The Court stated, "[T]he term 'idiot' was generally used to describe persons who
had a total lack of reason or understanding, or an inability to distinguish between
good and evil." The Court noted that the notion of an "idiot" bore resemblance to
the "modem definition of mental retardation."45 Common law prohibited punishing
"idiots" for crimes. The Court stated that this indicated that the execution of persons
who are "profoundly or severely retarded" may indeed be a violation of the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.46
One of the primary policy considerations for this determination was not allowing
the execution of a person who wholly lacked the ability to appreciate and

Aggravating factors are the opposite of mitigating factors-these are factors the sentencer can use to
impose a greater sentence, up to the statutory maximum. Common examples of aggravating circumstances are
evidence that the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death separate from the person murdered, or the fact
that "[tihe defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner." Ring, 536 U.S.
at 593 n.l.
39. The "special" issues, as laid out in the statute and presented to the jury, were:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would
result; (2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised by the evidence,
whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to
the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
Penry, 492 U.S. at 310 (quoting TEx. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989) (current version
at TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.0711 (Vernon Supp. 2005))).
40. Id. at 328.
41. Id. at 340.
42. Id. at 328.
43. Id. at 331-32.
44. Id. (citing 1 MATTHEw HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34 (1736)).
45. Id. at 332.
46. Id. at 333.
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understand the wrongfulness of his or her actions. 47 The Court stated, "Because of
the protections afforded by the insanity defense today, such a person is not likely
to be convicted or face the prospect ofpunishment."4' 8 Thus, the Court indicated that
the law allows for the same outcome whether a defendant has mental retardation or
is insane.49 The Court then attended to the specific situation by restating that the
defendant was found competent to stand trial and that the jury rejected the
defendant's ensuing insanity defense. 0 Since the Court found no legal difference
between mental retardation and insanity, the jury's findings would presumably have
been the same with respect to mental retardation.
The Court next addressed the defendant's argument that there is "an emerging
national consensus against execution of the mentally retarded, reflecting the
'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'51
Evidence of a national consensus allows the Court to establish a manifestation of
the evolving standards of decency required by the Constitution.52 The Court rejected
this argument because at the time only one state, Georgia, banned execution of
individuals with mental retardation.53 Therefore, the Court concluded that one
state's statute is not evidence of a national consensus.
54
The Court in Penry then addressed its previous holding in Fordv. Wainwright,
where the Court had examined general state practice as applied to the insanity
defense." The Court in Fordfound that "no State.. .permit[ted] the execution of the
insane,"5 6 and twenty-six states "explicitly requir[ed] suspension of the execution
of a capital defendant who became insane" post-conviction. 7 The Court in Ford
thus concluded that a sufficient national consensus existed.58 In contrast, the Court
in Penry concluded that two states prohibiting execution of defendants with mental
retardation, even combined with fourteen states rejecting capital punishment
altogether, was not evidence of a national consensus. 9
In Penry, the Court further stated that, in addition to the lack of a national
consensus on the issue, there was also no evidence that juries consistently avoided
execution of defendants with mental retardation.60 Further, there was no evidence
of prosecutorial decisions indicating a pattern of exempting persons with mental
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 333-34 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
52. See id.
53. Id. at 334 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-1310) (2004)). The Court did note that one other state,
Maryland, had also enacted a similar statute that would take effect shortly after the case had concluded.
54. 477 U.S. 399, 405-08 (1986).
55. See Penry, 492 U.S. 302 (examining the state practice regarding defendants with mental retardation
rather than insanity).
56. Ford,477 U.S. at 408, cited in Penry,492 U.S. at 334.
57. Ford,477 U.S. at 408 nn.l-2, cited in Penry, 492 U.S. at 334.
58. Id.
59. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334. The Court in Penry did not state what would constitute a national consensus.
In fact, the Court has not, in any case thus far, established the explicit requirements for a national consensus. Ellis,
supra note 17, at 179-80. Instead, both Penry and Atkins discuss ambiguously what is "evidence" of a national
consensus, allowing for flexibility in future cases and different issues. Id. at 180.
60. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334. The Court in Penry stated that juries often found defendants eligible for the
death penalty, regardless of whether or not there was evidence of mental retardation. See id.
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retardation from capital punishment.6" Instead, the defendant only offered public
opinion surveys indicating a somewhat abstract opposition to execution of
individuals with mental retardation.6 2 The Court acknowledged that public opinion
expressed in the surveys may eventually lead to changes in legislation, but, without
such legislation at the time, the Court did not feel justified in prohibiting execution
of defendants with mental retardation.63 Without an express national consensus
against executing defendants with mental retardation, the Court did not have
evidence of the evolving standards of decency required to find an Eighth
Amendment violation.'
Finally, the Court determined whether the application of the death penalty
addressed traditionally accepted goals of punishment. The Court in Penry found that
not all people with mental retardation "inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional, and
moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death
penalty."6 Thus, the Court determined that capital punishment for defendants with
mental retardation did not violate the Eighth Amendment.66 The Court further
concluded that the imposition of the death penaltyupon defendants with mental
retardation was not invariably out of proportion to the crime, 67 and the traditionally
accepted goals of punishment were invoked by executing defendants with mental
retardation.68 In addition, there was not an express national consensus banning such
executions. Therefore, the Court in Penry concluded that the Eighth Amendment
did not categorically prohibit the execution of defendants with mental retardation.69
B. Section 31-20A-2.1 of the CapitalFelony SentencingAct
In 1991, just two years after Penry, New Mexico implemented section 31-20A2.1 of the Capital Felony Sentencing Act,7" which prohibits the execution of
defendants with mental retardation.7" The statute defines "mentally retarded" as
"significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with
deficits in adaptive behavior., 72 The statute then discusses the procedural
implications of the Act.

61. Id.
62. Id. at 334-35.
63. Id. at 335.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 338.
66. Id. at 340.
67. See id. at 338 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
68. See id. (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). These traditionally accepted goals of
punishment are retribution and deterrence. See also infra note 113.
69. Id. at 340.
70. NMSA 1978, §§ 31-20A-1 to-6(1991).
71. NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1(B) (1991) ("The penalty ofdeath shall not be imposed on any person who
is mentally retarded.").
72. NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1 (A) (1991). This definition is significantly similar to the 1992 definition of
mental retardation as established by the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR), whose definition
"forms the basis of the definitions adopted by most of the State Legislatures that acted on this topic between the
Penry decision in 1989 and the Atkins decision in 2002." James W. Ellis, Mental Retardationand the Death
Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISAmLrrY L. REP. 11, 12 (2003)
[hereinafter Ellis, Legislative Guide].
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First, the statute mandates that a court shall hear, prior to the sentencing phase,
the issue of whether capital punishment shall be precluded upon a finding that the
defendant is mentally retarded.73 The statute then states that, if the court finds that
the defendant is mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall set
the sentence at life imprisonment.74 However, the statute limits this by stating that
"[a] ruling by the court that evidence of diminished intelligence introduced by the
defendant does not preclude the death penalty under this section shall not restrict
the defendant's opportunity to introduce such evidence at the sentencing proceeding
or to argue that that evidence should be given mitigating significance."75 Finally, the
statute states that if a jury performs the sentencing proceeding, then "the jury shall
not be informed of any ruling denying a defendant's motion under this section."7 6
The words in the statute and the mandate itself clearly express the legislature's
directive that execution of defendants with mental retardation is not acceptable in
New Mexico.77
C. Apprendi v. New Jersey
In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of aggravating
factors that increase the penalty of a crime beyond the statutory maximum.78 The
question presented in Apprendi was whether a judge may determine aggravating
factors that serve to increase a maximum sentence.79 In Apprendi, the Court
established that "the Sixth Amendment requires any fact, other than the fact of a
prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory
maximum to be proved to ajury beyond a reasonable doubt."8 The issue of mental
retardation was not before the Court in Apprendi.
Apprendi dealt with a defendant that had pled guilty to possession of a firearm
for unlawful purpose and unlawful possession of a bomb.82 The trial court had
doubled the sentence because it determined that the intent of the defendant was to
intimidate an individual or group because of race, thus applying the sentencing
provisions of the New Jersey Hate Crime Act.83 The Court in Apprendi determined
that the judge increased the defendant's sentence by finding an aggravating factor
not previously established by the jury; thus, the sentence was a violation of the
Sixth Amendment.84

73. NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1(C) (1991).
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. See infra Part V.A.
78. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466.
79. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466. Specifically, the Court addressed whether the judge could increase the
sentence of the defendant to twelve years, based on aggravating factors, when the statute had a maximum sentence
of ten years. Id.
80. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added).
81. While Apprendi does not address the issue of defendants with mental retardation, it is applicable to the
decision reached in Flores in determining if the absence of mental retardation is an aggravating factor requiring
a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt. See infra Parts IV.A, V.B.
82. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70.
83. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 1995), cited in Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470,490-91.
84. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470-71, 497-98. The Sixth Amendment states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy.. .[a] public trial, by an impartial jury...." U.S. CONST. amend. V1.
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The Court in Apprendi also addressed the Due Process clauses in the Fifth
Amendment 5 and the Fourteenth Amendment8 6 to determine whether the defendant
was denied due process because the question of racial motivation was not decided
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.87 The Court found a Fifth Amendment
violation by referencing its previous decision in Jones v. United States,88 wherein
it stated that
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury
trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction)
that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.89
The Court in Apprendi also held that the Fourteenth Amendment required the same
result.9 ° The Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Sixth
Amendment, taken together, "entitle a criminal defendant to 'a jury determination
that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond
a reasonable doubt. ' 91
In reaching its conclusion, the Court distinguished "sentencing factors" from
elements of a crime.92 However, the Court warned that a state could not get around
the protections offered in In re Winship93 for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt
"merely by 'redefin[ing] the elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing
them as factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment."' 94 Rather, courts must
determine whether the factor is truly an element of the crime or an aggravating
factor, and, if the factor is an element of a crime, it must be addressed by a jury. 95
The Court in Apprendi concluded by echoing its prior holding in Jones that,
"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 96 The Court further held that it was an
unconstitutional violation of due process for a legislature to stop a jury from
assessing facts that could increase the set range of penalties that a defendant may
97
amass.

85. The Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part, "No person shall.. .be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
86. The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part, "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
87. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
88. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
89. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 477-78 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)).
92. See id.at 485.
93. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
94. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485 (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975) (citing In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358)).
95. See id.
96. Id. at 490 (citing Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999)).
97. Id. (quotingJones, 526 U.S. at 252 (Stevens, J., concurring)).

Summer 2005]

DEFENDANTS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES

D. Atkins v. Virginia
Two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court in Atkins held that "[capital]
punishment is excessive and that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction
on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender."9' Atkins held
that executing people with mental retardation is cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment, overruling Penry on that point. 99 The Court in Atkins
focused on "evolving standards of decency,"1 based on the Court's interpretation
of state legislation, foreign laws, professional and religious views, and opinion
polls. 1 ' In addition, the Court determined that criminal sanctions must be in
proportion to the crime and must draw meaning from the evolving standards of
decency.' 02
The Court began its analysis by evaluating the "dramatic shift in the state
legislative landscape that has occurred in the past 13 years [since Penry].' ' 1° 3 The
Court pointed out that the meaning of the Eighth Amendment must be taken from
and judged by current societal and legal standards,' 4and that the "clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the
country's legislatures."'0 5 The Court then embarked upon a discussion of the history
of these evolving standards of decency, finding that, after Penry, "state legislatures
across the country began to address the issue."'0 6 The Court proceeded to list the
applicable state statutes. 0 7 The Supreme Court concluded that "the large number
of States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete
absence of States passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such
executions) provides powerful evidence that today our society views mentally
retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal."'0 8 Thus,
the Court found that "a national consensus has developed against" the practice of
executing individuals with mental retardation. 0 9
Finding a national consensus prohibiting the execution of defendants with mental
retardation, the Court in Atkins then stated that it would "leave to the State[s] the

98. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,321 (2002) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,405 (1986)).
99. Id.; see supra Part l.A (noting that the Eighth Amendment could not protect the whole class of
defendants with mental retardation); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
100. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (finding that the scope of the
Eighth Amendment is not static and that it "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society")).
101. Id. at 316 n.21. In fact, New Mexico's statute was one of those mentioned in Atkins to prove their claim
of evolving standards of decency. Id. at 314; see also infra note 107.
102. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12.
103. Id. at 310.
104. Seeid. at311-12.
105. Id. at 312 (quoting Penry,492 U.S. at 331).
106. Id. at 314.
107. Id.; see also, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-9-401
(West 1998); IND. CODE ANN.§§ 35-36-9-2 to 35-36-9-6 (Michie 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (1995); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130,532.135, 532.140 (Banks-Baldwin 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2003);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (West 2002). A complete listing of statutes prohibiting the death penalty for
people with mental retardation both before and afterAtkins can be found at Death Penalty Information Center, State
Statutes Prohibitingthe DeathPenaltyfor People with Mental Retardation,at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?did= 138&scid=28 (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
108. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16.
109. Id. at 316.
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task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon
its execution of sentences."" ' 0 The Court proceeded to discuss the definitions.' of
mental retardation and how these definitions limit the procedural protections of
defendants with mental retardation." 2 The Court then explained that, given the
deficiencies inherently present in defendants with mental retardation, the typical
reasons for applying the death penalty become invalid.' '3
The Court concluded that, in light of evolving standards of decency, the Eighth
Amendment now prohibits the execution of defendants with mental retardation.'
The Court reasoned that executing mentally retarded offenders is both excessive and
considered cruel and unusual punishment. " 5 As such, the Constitution substantively
restricts states' power to follow through with these executions." 6
E. Ring v. Arizona
Four days after the Court decided Atkins, it decided Ring v. Arizona.'17 Ring did
not involve mental retardation but, rather, a Sixth Amendment challenge to the
Arizona statute in which a judge was permitted to impose the death penalty if the
judge found "at least one aggravating circumstance and... 'no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.""' 8 The statute at issue in Ring
explicitly listed the aggravating circumstances that the judge could use to impose
the death penalty." 9 However, the mitigating circumstances were not exclusively
listed, 20 and additional mitigating circumstances were to be determined by the
judge. 2 ' The trial judge in Ring found two aggravating circumstances and one
mitigating factor not listed in the statute.' 22 However, the judge determined that the

110. Id. at 317 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986)).
111. See, e.g., supranote 72 and accompanying text.
112. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 n.22. For example, even though people with mental retardation are not more
likely to engage in criminal activities than others, there is evidence that they do have a tendency to "act on impulse
rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan." Id. at 318.
113. Id. at 318-19. First, the Court stated that the typical "retribution" and "deterrence" justifications for
imposing the death penalty do not apply because imposing the death penalty upon a person with mental retardation
may not significantly contribute to either of these justifications. Id. This is because people with mental retardation
cannot comprehend the impact of their actions or the consequences; thus, the death penalty becomes a "purposeless
and needless imposition of pain and suffering." Id. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).
Second, the Court stated that "[tihe reduced capacity of mentally retarded offenders.. .mak[es] such offenders
ineligible for the death penalty." Id. at 320.
114. Id.at321.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
117. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
118. Id. at 592-93 (quoting AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (West 2001)). While Ring does not address
the issue of defendants with mental retardation, it is applicable to the decision reached in Flores in determining
if the absence of mental retardation is an aggravating factor requiring a jury determination beyond a reasonable
doubt. See infra Part IV.A. It is interesting to note that, although Ring was decided merely four days after Atkins,
Ring does not discuss Atkins or its holding therein. However, this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
119. Id.at593n.l.
120. A list of mitigating circumstances is never exclusive. Ring, 536 U.S. at 593 n.2. See generally Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
121. Ring, 536 U.S. at 593 n.2.
122. Id. at 594-95.
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to overcome the two aggravating factors and
mitigating factor was not sufficient
23
imposed the death penalty.1
The Court in Ring applied its earlier decision in Apprendi, wherein it established
that the Sixth Amendment requires any fact "[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction.. .that increasesthe penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
24
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."'
The holding also resolved the tension between Apprendi and a previously decided
case addressing a similar issue, Walton v. Arizona. 125 In doing so, the Court
overruled Walton insofar as Walton allowed a judge, without a jury, to find
"aggravating circumstance[s] necessary for imposition of the death penalty.' 26 The
Court in Ring determined that each aggravating factor in a capital prosecution
proved beyond a
serves as an element of a greater offense and, as such,
27 must be
reasonable doubt pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. 1
Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court rulings in Penry,Apprendi,Atkins, andRing,
as well as the New Mexico statute prohibiting the execution of defendants with
mental retardation, the New Mexico Supreme Court took up Flores.128 In Flores,the
court evaluated a statute that was more than a decade old within the confines of
modem jurisprudence. By evaluating cases that had been decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court since New Mexico's statute was originally enacted, the court in
Floresconfirmed the constitutionality of New Mexico's approach.
111. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in State v. Flores'2 9 determined that
the applicable statute was not unconstitutional and did not violate the defendant's
due process rights under the circumstances of the case. 3 ' The defendant, Ruben
Flores, was charged with murdering and raping ninety-four-year-old Helen
Neithercutt.13' The prosecutor filed the intent to seek capital punishment for Flores,
and a few months later the trial court ordered a determination of the defendant's
competence to stand trial. 132 Ruben Flores underwent two psychiatric evaluations,
after which the trial court determined that he was dangerous and incompetent to
stand trial. 33 The trial court further posited that the defendant had mental
retardation.'34 As a result of this finding, Flores was committed to a medical center
for three months of treatment, after which he was deemed competent to stand
trial. 3 5 At that point, Flores filed a pretrial motion to dismiss due to his mental
retardation. The court found the motion premature and stated that section 31-20A123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 595.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added), cited in Ring, 536 U.S. at 595.
497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruledby Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
Id. See also supra note 84.
See infra Part IV.
2004-NMSC-021, 93 P.3d 1264.
See id.
State's Brief in Chief at 1, State v. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 93 P.3d 1264 (No. 27,845).
Id.
Flores,2004-NMSC-021, 1 4, 93 P.3d at 1266.
Id.
Id.
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2.1(C) of the Capital Felony Criminal Sentencing Act'36 required that "the
retardation [was] to occur only after the guilt-innocence
determination of mental
137
phase of the trial."'
The "[d]efendant then filed [a] motion requesting a jury determination of his
mental retardation. ' 138 The defendant analogized the determination of mental
retardation to the due process requirement that certain legal issues must "be
resolved prior to.. .admission at trial."' 39 The defendant further argued that Ring v.
Arizona required that any factual finding that increases the statute's maximum
punishment must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 ' The trial court
agreed and held that the statute establishing the timeframe for the examination of
mental retardation, as well as the procedure by which mental retardation shall be
determined, was unconstitutional.' 4 ' The trial court certified and the court of
appeals accepted the issue for interlocutory appeal. The matter was then certified
to the New Mexico Supreme Court.'42 Upon review, the New Mexico Supreme
Court unanimously overturned the district court's ruling and found that the statute,
as it stands, is constitutionally valid. "'
IV. RATIONALE
Justice Chavez, writing for a unanimous court, began the opinion in Flores'" by
referencing Atkins v. Virginia's'45 holding that the "execution of persons with
mental retardation violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment."' 46 The court in Floresthen noted that, eleven years before the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins, New Mexico's legislature implemented the
Criminal Felony Sentencing Act,147 a portion of which was intended to prohibit
imposing the death penalty on offenders with mental retardation.'4 8 The court stated
that the legislature set up procedures to determine which defendants are exempted
from the death penalty on the basis of their mental retardation.'4 9 As iterated in
Flores, section 31-20A-2.1 states that the trial court must hold a pre-sentencing
hearing to determine whether to preclude the death penalty. 5 ° Further, the court
established that section 31-20A-2.1 provides that the death penalty in a capital case
"shall be precluded 'if the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence,' that the

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
to impose
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-1 to -6 (1991).
Flores,2004-NMSC-021, 5, 93 P.3d at 1266.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that any aggravating factor necessary
the death penalty must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)).
Id.
id.
Id. 21, 93 P.3dat 1271.
2004-NMSC-021, 93 P.3d 1264.
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 1 1, 93 P.3d at 1265.
NMSA 1978, §§ 31-20A-1 to -6 (1991).
Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 1, 93 P.3d at 1265 (citing NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1 (1991)).
Id. (citing NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1(C) (1991)).
Id. (quoting NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1(C) (1991)).
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defendant has mental retardation."'' The court in Florescited Atkins and the New
Mexico statute as authority for the reasoning that followed.
The New Mexico Supreme Court dealt with three issues in Flores:(1) whether
"the absence of mental retardation is an element of a capital crime which the state
must prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt,"' 52 (2) whether the New Mexico
statute requires that a finding of mental
retardation must be delayed until after the
"guilt-innocence phase of the trial,"' 53 and (3) "whether the defendant is entitled to
present evidence of mental retardation to the jury at sentencing and how to give
effect to such a finding."' 4 The defendant in Flores alleged that he was mentally
retarded and, thus, not eligible for the death penalty due to the Court's holding in
Atkins and the language of section 3 1-20A-2.1."' The State responded with two
arguments: (1) the statute's procedures do not mandate that a jury finds a lack of
mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) New Mexico's statutory
procedure does not allow for the judge to make a pretrial finding of mental
retardation. 5' 6
A. Standardof Prooffor the Determinationof Mental Retardation
The first issue addressed by the court was whether the absence of mental
retardation is an element of a capital crime that must be decided by the jury beyond
a reasonable doubt.'57 The opinion restated the defendant's contention that a jury
determination beyond-a-reasonable-doubt is required under Ring v. Arizona'58 and
Atkins.159 The defendant stated that the result ofAtkins was that "mental retardation
is a factual issue upon which a defendant's eligibility for death depends."' 6 The
defendant in Flores combined the findings in Ring and Atkins and argued that "the
absence of mental retardation is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater
offense and therefore must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."''
The defendant in Flores further argued that evaluating Ring in light of the
holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey162 assisted the court in its findings. Both Ring
and Apprendi addressed an increase in punishment and whether it is more
appropriate for the judge or the jury to find factors that serve to increase the
penalty, potentially to death. 163 However, the court in Floresdistinguished Ring in
two key ways: (1) mental retardation was not at issue in Ring, and (2) the judge in

151. Id. (quoting NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1(C) (1991)).
152. Id.1 1,93 P.3d at 1266.
153. Id.
154.

Id.

155. Id. 2, 93 P.3d at 1266.
156. Id.
157. Id. 16, 93 P.3d at 1267.
158. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
159. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
160. Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
161. Flores,2004-NMSC-021, 6, 93 P.3d at 1267.
162. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
163. Flores,2004-NMSC-021, 6,93 P.3d at 1267 (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 592-93 (stating that Arizona's
law unconstitutionally allowed ajudge, not ajury, to find aggravating circumstances necessary to impose the death
penalty)); see also supraPart I.E.
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Ring was imposing capital punishment after a finding of aggravating circumstances
that increasedrather than decreased the maximum sentence.' 64
The court concluded that neither Apprendi nor Ring applies to cases where the
factual finding functions to lower the maximum punishment.1 6 1 In fact, the court
fully quoted the portion of Apprendi where the Court distinguished between facts
in aggravation and facts in mitigation. 66 Flores acknowledged the holding in
Apprendi, which established that ajudge can punish a defendant up to the maximum
sentence allowed for the specific crime upon which the jury found facts. 167 In
addition, the court in Flores stated that the Apprendi decision allowed the judge to
reduce the defendant's sentence. 6 This reduction could be based upon mitigating
factors without deprivation of the defendant's freedoms beyond that authorized by
the jury. 169 The court in Flores distinguished Apprendi by stating that the presence
or absence of mental retardation would not increase the maximum sentence
allowed.'70 Further, the defendant in Flores was not exposed to a "deprivation of
liberty" that exceeded that authorized by the statute, which was the scenario in
Apprendi.171

The court in Flores further distinguished Ring and Apprendi by restating that in
Flores a determination of mental retardation would reduce the maximum possible
sentence.172 Thus, the court concluded, the absence of mental retardation is not an
element that must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, as required
under the Sixth Amendment. 1' Rather,74it is a mitigating factor that allows the court
to decrease the defendant's sentence. 1
The court, moreover, established that this conclusion is consistent with not only
Ring and Apprendi, but also with federal court opinions and opinions from other
states.' 7 5 The court noted that the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 71 6 the Georgia
Supreme Court, 7 7 and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 7 have all held that the
absence of mental retardation is not an element of a crime and, thus, does not
require a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt. 179 The court in Flores
agreed with the Fifth Circuit, Georgia, and Texas.' Thus, the court held that the

164. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021,
165. Id.

7, 93 P.3d at 1267.

166. Id. (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.16).
167. Id. 6, 93 P.3d at 1267.
168. Id.

7, 93 P.3d at 1267 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.16 (distinguishing between facts in

mitigation and facts in aggravation; allowing the judge to find facts in mitigation that serve to reduce the
defendant's sentence)).
The presence of mental retardation would decrease the
530
U.S. at 490 n.16).
169. Id. (citing Apprendi,
retrdaton old n nlter the maymum sentence. Id.
.
.I
maximum sentcn

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 8, 93 P.3d at 1267.

176. In re Johnson,'334 F.3d 403, 405 (5th Cir. 2003).

177. Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 620 (Ga. 2003).
178. Exparte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
8, 93 P.3d at 1267-68 (citing and quoting Head, 587 S.E.2d at 620;
179. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021,
"
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 10; Johnson, 334 F.3d at 405).
180. Id. 8, 93 P.3d at 1268.
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absence of mental retardation is not an element of capital murder and, as such, does
not require a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt."8 '
B. Timing of a Hearing to Determine Mental Retardation
The court then moved to the second issue: whether section 31-20A-2.1 requires
that the determination of mental retardation must be delayed until after the guiltinnocence phase of the trial or whether it can occur pretrial.8 2 The defendant argued
that section 31-20A-2. I(C) "is unconstitutional under Atkins because it does not
permit a pretrial determination of the issue of mental retardation."' 83 The court
looked to the statute, which states in relevant part:
Upon motion of the defense requesting a ruling that the penalty of death be
precluded under this section, the court shall hold a hearing, priorto conducting
If the court finds, by a preponderance of the
the sentencing proceeding....
evidence, that the defendant is mentally retarded, it shall sentence the defendant
to life imprisonment."l
The State responded that the language, as stated, "requires that the hearing take
place only after the guilt-innocence phase of the trial."' 85 The court found that,
suggests this reading, it does not
although the language highlighted above
"expressly preclude an earlier hearing."' 86 The court emphasized that the statute
"prior
does not restrict the timing of the hearing itself
87 beyond ensuring that it occurs
to conducting the sentencing proceeding."'
The court then stated that a broader reading of the statute is appropriate, in part
because of the "flexibility of the related procedure for determining whether the
defendant has mental retardation for purposes of competency to stand trial."'8 8 The
court pointed out that the section regarding competency to stand trial and section
31-20A-2.1 define mental retardation in the same way.' 89 In addition, the court
pointed out that under both of the above-mentioned sections, the "hearing to
determine mental retardation is triggered by a motion of the defendant, ' 9° the
9
"burden of persuasion is on the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence,"' '
and "an intelligence quotient of seventy or below establishes a presumption of

181. Id.
182. Id. 9H 1, 9, 93 P.3d at 1266, 1268; NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1 (1991).
183. Flores,2004-NMSC-021,1 9, 93 P.3d at 1268.
184. Id. (quoting NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2. 1(C) (1991)) (emphasis added).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. (quoting NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1 (C) (1991)).
188. Id. 1 10, 93 P.3d at 1268 (referencing Rule 5-602(B)(1) NMRA (allowing for a determination of
competency "at any stage of the proceedings")). Statutes that "relate to the same class of things [should be]
considered to be in pari materia" and construed to give full effect to every provision of each statute. Id. (quoting
State ex rel. State Park & Recreation Comm'n v. N.M. State Auth., 76 N.M. 1, 18, 411 P.2d 984, 996 (1966)).
189. Id.; NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1 (1991). "Mental retardation" is defined as "significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior" in section 31-20A-2.1 (A)
and in section 31-9-1.6(E).
190. Flores,2004-NMSC-021, 10, 93 P.3d at 1269 (citing NMSA 1978, §§ 31-9-1.6(A), 31-20A-2.1(C)
(1999)).
191. Id. (citing NMSA 1978, §§ 31-9-1.6(B), 31-20A-2.1(C) (1999)).
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mental retardation."'' 92 The court compared these statutes and offered the same
flexible reading for both.'93
However, the court also pointed out the applicable difference between the two
above-referenced statutes. 9 4 Whereas in the competency statute the hearing to
determine competency can be invoked at any stage of the proceeding, the capital
punishment statute is silent on the issue. 95 The court reiterated that, under both
statutes, the hearing is triggered by the defendant's motion and stated that it would
not make logical sense to require two separate hearings on the same issue.' 96 The
court pointed out that both hearings would require substantially similar
presentations and, as such, should be eligible to be heard at the same time (in other
words, at any time the defendant sees fit to invoke the hearing).' 97 Further, the court
stated that, rather than reading an omission as intentional, the statutes should be
read, as much as possible, to prevent "absurdity, hardships, or injustice."198 The
court thus concluded that, when a defendant makes a pretrial motion to determine
whether the death penalty shall be precluded based upon a determination of mental
retardation, section 31-20A-2. 1(C) permits such a hearing. 99
The court in Flores then discussed the economic factors of a capital trial. The
court asserted that a pretrial determination of mental retardation is appropriate
because of the resources a capital trial demands.2 "0 The court stated that it would be
beneficial to the parties to allow determination of this issue "as early in the
proceedings as possible., 20' Along these lines, the court cited its prior decision in
State v. Ogden,20 2 wherein it acknowledged that trials involving capital punishment
are distinct from other criminal proceedings, and that capital prosecutions "involve
tremendous hardships in terms of time, emotion, energy, and expense. 20 3 Based
upon the "extraordinary nature of capital prosecutions," 2" the court in Flores
determined that, where a finding of mental retardation may preclude a death
sentence, "every effort must be made to avoid a death-penalty trial, as early in the
proceedings as possible. 20 5
The court in Flores further concluded that avoiding a death-penalty trial is
particularly important when mental retardation is involved.206 The court again
acknowledged the holding in Atkins, which stated that defendants with mental
retardation "'face a special risk of wrongful execution' because they 'may be less
able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor witnesses,

192.
193.
!94.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. (citing NMSA 1978, §§ 31-9-1.6(E), 31-20A-2.1(A) (1999)).
Id. I 11, 93 P.3d at 1269.
Id.
Id. (citing NMSA 1978, § 31-9-1 (1993)); see also NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.I(C) (1991).
Flores,2004-NMSC-021, 1 11, 93 P.3d at 1269.
Id.
Id. (quoting Cox v. City of Albuquerque, 53 N.M. 334, 340, 207 P.2d 1017, 1021 (1949)).
Id.
Id. 12, 93 P.3d at 1269.
Id.
118 N.M. 234, 880 P.2d 845 (1994).
Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 12,93 P.3d at 1269 (citing Ogden, 118 N.M. at 238, 880 P.2d at 849).
Id.
Id.
Id. 12-13, 93 P.3d at 1269.
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and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for
their crimes.'" 2 7 The court further used Atkins to bolster its contention that these
characteristics contain a constitutional dimension because "their impairments can
jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital proceedings.""2 Thus, the court
concluded that a pretrial motion under section 31-20A-2.1 (C) for a determination
of mental retardation should be permitted when the defendant has moved for such
a hearing.20 9
C. Mental Retardationas a MitigatingFactor
The third point the court examined was whether the defendant was entitled to
present evidence of mental retardation to the jury at sentencing and how to give
effect to a finding that he was mentally retarded. 20 The court began this portion of
its analysis by discussing Penry v. Lynaugh21 ' and found that defendants with
mental retardation shall not be subject to capital punishment because its nature is
excessive under the constraints set forth in the Eighth Amendment.2 2 The court in
Flores also pointed out that Atkins overruled Penry on that issue.21 3
The court then stated that, although Atkins did not address the argument on
mitigating evidence, other federal cases have addressed mitigating versus
aggravating evidence. 214 The court cited Lockett v. Ohio215 and Eddings v.
Oklahoma.216 Both cases established that the sentencer shall be permitted to
consider, as a mitigating factor, aspects and circumstances offered by the defendant
to seek a sentence less than death. 217 The court further stated that Penry "held that
this principle applies to any mitigating evidence, including evidence of mental
retardation., 218 Thus, the court in Floresheld that the sentencing jury must be able
29
to consider the mitigating factor of whether the defendant had mental retardation.
The court then discussed section 31-20A-2. 1(C), which states that, although the
trial court must "decide the issue of mental retardation in the first instance," the
defendant also had the right to a jury consideration of the mitigating factor of

207. Id. 13, 93 P.3d at 1269 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002)).
208. Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306-07).
209. Id.; NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1 (1991).
210. Flores, 2004-NMSC-02 1,I13, 14,93 P.3d at 1266, 1270.
211. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruled in part by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (finding that the execution of
defendants with mental retardation does not violate the Eighth Amendment). The Court in Penryrejected the claim
that the execution of a criminal defendant with mental retardation violated the Eighth Amendment sanction against
cruel and unusual punishment. Id.; see also supra Part II.A.
212. Flores,2004-NMSC-021, 14,93 P.3d at 1269-70 (citing Penry, 492 U.S. at 340); see alsosupra Part
ll.A.
213. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 14, 93 P.3d at 1270. Floresdid not address the validity of the statement
in Penry that the "sentencing jury in a capital trial 'must be able to consider and give effect to any mitigating
evidence relevant to a defendant's background and character or the circumstances of the crime."' Id. (quoting
Penry, 492 U.S. at 328). However, this issue was addressed in Tennardv. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004), wherein
the Court made clear that the mitigating portion of the decision in Penry still applies.
214. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 14, 93 P.3d at 1270.
215. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
216. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
217. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 14, 93 P.3d at 1270 (citing Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; Eddings, 455 U.S.
at 114).
218. Id.
219. Id.
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"diminished intelligence."2 2 The court stated the statutory requirement that, even
if a court finds that the defendant is not precluded from the death penalty due to his
"diminished intelligence," the defendant should still have the opportunity to
introduce evidence of his mental retardation at the sentencing proceeding.22' The
court thus held that, at the very least, a defendant should be able to argue that this
evidence should be considered as a mitigating factor.222 .
In other words, the court pointed out that the statute explicitly states that, if a
judge does not find that the defendant has mental retardation, this shallnot restrict
the defendant's opportunity to introduce evidence of mental retardation at
sentencing. This means that, in any event, the sentencing jury shall have access to
the mitigating evidence. Thus, the court continued, the statute is not unconstitutional 223 and, instead, "comports with the Penry rule to the extent it provides an
opportunity for the jury to consider and give mitigating effect to evidence of
'diminished intelligence.' ' 224 The court then stated that the definition of mental
retardation in the statute shows that evidence of diminished intelligence is a factor
"probative of mental retardation. 2 25
The court continued by stating that, if section 31-20A-2.1(C) were read to
"restrict the jury's opportunity to consider and give mitigating effect to other
evidence probative of mental retardation,, 226 then it would not comport with
Lockett, Eddings, and Penry.227 The court explained that this failure to comply
would restrict the defendant's right to proffer additional evidence and would render
the statute unconstitutional. 22' The unconstitutionality would arise because, as seen
in Lockett, Eddings, and Penry, a defendant must be given the opportunity to
present all mitigating factors at sentencing.229 In the present situation, the court
found that it must permit the defendant to introduce "any admissible evidence of
mental retardation" because this evidence may have a mitigating effect at
sentencing. 230
The court then stated that, although it found that "mental retardation is not an
element of a capital offense"231 and need not "be proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, a determination of mental retardation by the jury at sentencing
nevertheless must stand as an absolute bar to imposition of the death penalty. 2 32

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. 15, 93 P.3d at 1270 (quoting NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1(C) (1991)).
Id. (quoting NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1(C) (1991)).
Id. (citing NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1(C) (1991)).
See id.
Id.
Id.
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227. Id.
228. Id.The court stated that a statute must be construed, if possible, such that it is constitutional. Id.(citing
State v. Wade, 100 N.M. 152, 154, 667 P.2d 459, 461 (1983); Huey v. Lente, 85 N.M. 597, 598, 514 P.2d 1093,
1094 (1973) ("If a statute is susceptible to two constructions, one supporting it and the other rendering it void, a
court should adopt the construction which will uphold its constitutionality.")).
229. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 16, 93 P.3d at 1270.
230. Id.
231. Id. 1 17, 93 P.3d at 1270 (emphasis added).
232. Id. (referencing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321) (emphasis added). The Court in Atkins stated, "[T]he
Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender."
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
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The court then stated that, "[a]fter Atkins,...the 'mitigating significance'... of a
jury's determination of mental retardation must be conclusive,"23' 3 establishing that
a jury finding mental retardation necessarily precludes the death penalty.234 The
court found that section 31-20A-2.1(C) validates this conclusion, stating that a
"finding of mental retardation at sentencing must be given conclusive mitigating
is entitled to
effect ' 235 and that, as stated in prior discussion, the defendant
2 36
stage.
sentencing
the
at
retardation
mental
of
evidence
introduce
The court then established a test, asserting several general conditions that must
be met to "enable the jury during the capital sentencing phase to give conclusive
mitigating effect to a finding of mental retardation. 237 This test provides that (1) the
defendant must have a chance at sentencing to introduce evidence of "'general
intellectual functioning' and 'deficits in adaptive behavior' 2, 3' and to argue that this
evidence is "probative of mental retardation,, 239 (2) "the jury must be instructed on
the statutory definition of mental retardation, ''240 and (3) "the jury must resolve the
issue ofmental retardation before it may proceed to its consideration of aggravating
and other mitigating factors." 24' If the elements of-this test are met, the jury will
then be able242 "to give conclusive mitigating effect to a finding of mental
retardation.',
D. Standardof Prooffor a Jury Finding of MitigatingFactors
The court concluded the opinion by stating that a special verdict is required to
find mental retardation because it must be considered separate from the other
aggravating and mitigating factors, as set out in the third prong of the test above.243
The court explained that this special verdict is required because the determination
of mental retardation, or the absence thereof, is not an element of the crime to be
proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 4 Instead, the presence or absence
[and] the jury must be
of mental retardation "must be determined conclusively,
245
instructed to apply a specific standard of proof."
Finally, the court discussed whether the sentencing jury needed to unanimously
find the presence or absence of mental retardation in order to give the finding

233. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 17,93 P.3d at 1270-71 (quoting NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1(C) (1991)).
234. Id. 17,93P.3dat 1271.
235. Id. (citing NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1(C) (1991) ("A ruling by the court that evidence of diminished
intelligence introduced by the defendant does not preclude the death penalty under this section shall not restrict
the defendant's opportunity to introduce such evidence at the sentencing proceeding or to argue that that evidence
should be given mitigating significance.")).
236. See supra notes 210-222 and accompanying text.
237. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021,1 18, 93 P.3d at 1271.
238. Id. (quoting NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1 (A) & (C) (1991) (defining "mentally retarded" and instructing
on procedures for related hearing)).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. 119, 93 P.3d at 1271.
244. See id.; see.alsosupra Part V.A.
245. Flores,2004-NMSC-021, 19, 93 P.3d at 1271. This standard of proof has not been addressed by the
legislature inNew Mexico; therefore, it is applied, as articulated in section 31-20A-2.1 (C), by apreponderance of
the evidence. If this standard is met, then the jury "must sentence the defendant to life imprisonment." Id.
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"conclusive mitigating effect."2'46 The court cited its prior opinion, Clarkv. Tansy,247
wherein it held that the jury did not need to unanimously agree on the presence of
mitigating factors before considering them.24 However, the court in Flores stated
that Clark did not address the current issue because, under the relevant jury
instructions2 49 and the Capital Felony Sentencing Act,25 "the sentencing jury must
unanimously specify the sentence of death."2 '' Although this is different from
determining mitigating factors, as seen in Clark,252 the court reasoned that since a
sentencing jury must unanimously determine that a defendant is eligible for the
death penalty, the sentencing jury must also unanimously specify that mental
retardation is not present.25 3
The court further reasoned that this conclusion is necessary because, if the jury
does not find that mental retardation is present in a capital prosecution, then it will
move on to its consideration of aggravating and other mitigating factors, leaving the
sentencing open for the death penalty. 254 Because the death penalty would
potentially be imposed upon the defendant, the jury must be unanimous in its
finding that the defendant is not mentally retarded, establishing, in effect, that
capital punishment may be imposed.255 If the jury is not unanimous in finding the
absence of mental retardation, section 3 1-20A-2
1(C) requires that "the court shall
256
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.,
The court in Flores, through its analysis, found that a jury may find the absence
of mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable
doubt, because the lack of mental retardation does not increase the maximum
statutory sentence.25 7 The court also found that a pretrial determination on the issue
of mental retardation is neither required nor precluded by the statute, but rather that,
if the defendant requests a pretrial hearing on the issue, the hearing must be held at
that time. 258 Finally, the court found that a defendant can present mental retardation
to the sentencing jury as a conclusive mitigating factor. 9
V. ANALYSIS
New Mexico has prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on offenders with
mental retardation since 1991. Nevertheless, State v. Flores6 . is an important and
timely case because the recent Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia26

246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. 20, 93 P.3dat 1271.
118 N.M. 486, 882 P.2d 527 (1994).
Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 20,93 P.3d at 1271 (citing Clark, 118 N.M. at 494, 882 P.2d at 535).
UJI 14-7029 NMRA.

250.

NMSA 1978, §§ 31-20A-1 to -6 (1991).

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 19, 93 P.3d at 1271.
Id. 120, 93 P.3d at 1271.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1(C) (1979)).
See supra PartW.A.

258. See supra Part I.B.

259. See supra Part 1V.C-D.
260. 2004-NMSC-021, 93 P.3d 1264.
261. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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elevated this prohibition from a mere "statutory implementation of a public policy
choice" to a constitutional mandate.262 As such, it is no longer at the states'
discretion to prohibit capital punishment. Instead, the states must take into account
the Supreme Court's mandate that no person with mental retardation shall be
executed and that states must ensure that the policies set forth by state legislatures
protect this constitutionally mandated right.263 Further, using the intersection of the
decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey'6 and Ring v. Arizona,26 5 the court in Flores
established that a lack of mental retardation is not an aggravating factor that
increases the maximum sentence allowed. 66 Evaluating Floresagainst the backdrop
of Atkins, Apprendi, andRing, as well as taking into account section 3 1-20A-2.1 of
New Mexico's statutes, illustrates that Floreswas decided correctly, albeit limited
in its result.267
A. Flores' Application of Section 31-20A-2.1
As discussed in the rationale above,26 8 the defendant in Floresincorrectly argued
underAtkins that section 3 1-20A-2. 1 is unconstitutional because "it does not permit
a pretrial determination of the issue of mental retardation."'269 The court found that
New Mexico's statutory procedure does not violate the Constitution because mental
retardation reduces, rather than increases, the maximum punishment allowed. 27" The
court also held that the Constitution does not demand that the judge make a pretrial
determination of the defendant's alleged mental retardation, but if the defendant
requests a hearing on the issue271pretrial, it is a permissible reading of the statute to
allow the hearing at that time.
The New Mexico statute at issue is brief and to the point. The court in Flores
broadly interpreted section 31-20A-2.1 to allow for a pretrial determination on the
issue of mental retardation. 273 The State logically interpreted the statute's language
that the hearing was to occur after the guilt-innocence phase of the trial: "The court
274
cannot sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without a finding of guilt.
However, although a logical interpretation of the statute can be found to mandate
that the judicial hearing on the question of mental retardation should occur after the

262. Brief of Amicus Curiae James W. Ellis at 4, State v. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 93 P.3d 1264 (No.
27,845). The issue was argued under the U.S. Constitution because the decision in Atkins established that the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive, cruel, and unusual punishment precludes the imposition of capital
punishment on defendants with mental retardation. See Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
263. See generallyAmicus Curiae Brief at 4, Flores(No. 27,845).
264. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
265. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
266. See supra Part IV.A.
267. See infra Part V.B-C.
268. See supra Part IV.
269. Flores,2004-NMSC-021,1 9,93 P.3d at 1268; NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1 (1991).
270. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 1 3, 93 P.3d at 1266.
271. Id.
272. NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1 (1991).
273. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 3, 93 P.3d at 1266. The statute states that "the court shall hold a hearing,
prior to conducting the sentencing proceeding... [and i]fthe court finds.. that the defendant is mentally retarded,
it shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment." NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1(C) (1991).
274. State's Brief in Reply to Amicus Curiae at 13, State v. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 93 P.3d 1264 (No.
27,845); see Flores, 2004-NMSC-021,
9, 93 P.3d at 1268.
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guilt-innocence phase of the trial, it is not the only or the best interpretation. 275 The
court's broad and flexible reading of the statute permits the parties involved to
forego the timely and expensive aspects of trying a capital case.276
A broader reading of the statute also allows the constitutional mandate handed
down by the Court inAtkins will be met, ensuring the most impartial decision on the
issue.277 Specifically, the prosecution argued in Floresthat procedures to apply the
Atkins rule, as they were left to the states, "should be designed to provide an
impartial adjudication that focuses on the clinical evaluation and other relevant
evidence concerning a defendant's mental disability. 2 78 Allowing the judge to
determine the question of mental retardation before the trial prevents all parties
from expending unnecessary time, money, and energy.2 79
The court was further justified in its flexible reading of the statute because of the
related statute regarding mental retardation.2 8 The New Mexico statute regarding
the defendant's competency to stand trial defines mental retardation in the same
manner as section 31-20A-2. 1.281 The court appropriately found justification for
reading section 31-20A-2.1 with the flexibility that it did.2" 2 Although the
competency statute specifically discussed the fact that a hearing to determine mental
retardation can occur at any point in the proceeding, the capital punishment statute
did not address this issue at all.2 3 The court in Floresheld that two statutes, similar
in content and purpose, should be read with the same practical implications-here,
that a hearing addressing the defendant's mental capacity can occur before the trial
has commenced.284
The court's broad interpretation was contrary to one of the commonly accepted
canons of statutory interpretation: if one statute expressly states a mandate and the
other omits it, then the omission was intentional.285 If the court had addressed the
omission in this manner, then the hearing on the issue of the defendant's mental
retardation would necessarily occur after the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, in
line with the State's argument. The court in Flores instead followed a different
common canon of statutory interpretation and stated that "[s]tatutes should be
construed in the most beneficial way of which their language is susceptible to

275. The court in Flores interpreted the language more broadly, allowing the defendant to raise the issue of
mental retardation before the full trial has occurred. See infra notes 280-293 and accompanying text.
276. See generally Ellis, Legislative Guide, supra note 72, at t4-15. Eliminating a capital trial saves both
the defendant and the State time and money. Id.
277. See generallyAmicus Curiae Brief at Part ll.B-C, Flores (No. 27,845).
278. Amicus Curiae Brief at 9, Flores (No. 27,845).
279. Al additiona complton rises in having to postnon the jury's work while the judge hears the issue
of mental retardation. Moreover, if the judge finds that the defendant is not mentally retarded, asking the jury "to

ignore the rather obvious implication of what had" just happened is also problematic. See Amicus Curiae Brief at
10, Flores (No. 27,845).

280. See NMSA 1978, § 31-9-1.6(A) (1999).
281. See supra note 72 and accompanying text; NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1 (1991).
282. See Flores, 2004-NMSC-021,
10, 93 P.3d at 1268.

283. Id. l11, 93 P.3d at 1269.
284. Id.
285. See, e.g., Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450, 459 (Tenn. 2004) ("[When one statute contains a given

provision, the omission of the same provision from a similar statute is significant to show that a different intention
existed.") (citing State v. Lewis, 958 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tenn. 1997)).
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prevent absurdity, hardships, or injustice."2 6 The court's choice of interpretation
is the more appropriate one because it avoids the absurdity of requiring a post-trial
hearing on the same issue as a pretrial competency hearing.28 7 The court's statutory
interpretation also avoids hardships and the injustice of wasting the time and money
of the defendant and the State.288
The statutory interpretation discussed above allowed the court in Floresto easily
decide that the capital punishment statute allows a determination of mental retardation at any point in the proceeding, upon the request of the defendant. 289 The court
justified this broad and flexible reading of section 3 1-20A-2.1 on the ground that
it was in the best interest of all parties involved to move through capital trials as
quickly as possible.29 The court further pointed out that any proceeding that would
assist in avoiding a death-penalty trial early on in the proceedings is extremely
beneficial when mental retardation is at issue because of the added difficulties
defendants with mental retardation and their attorneys suffer. 291 This reasoning also
assists in circumventing the hardship expressed above.292 If a defendant is deemed
mentally retarded, and thus categorically excluded from consideration
of the death
293
penalty, the trial necessarily runs more quickly and smoothly.
The court in Flores also addressed the third portion of section 31-20A-2.1,
wherein it stated that, although a judge must decide in the first instance the question
of mental retardation, ifthe judge determines that there is no mental retardation, the
jury may also consider the issue at sentencing as a mitigating factor. 294 The court
found that, because of this allowance, section 31-20A-2.1 was not unconstitutional.2 95 The court properly interpreted the statute to allow for due process by way
of a jury determination of mitigating factors, 296 allowing the defendant his constitutionally
mandated right to present all mitigating factors at the sentencing phase of
2 97
trial.

In considering all arguments, the court ensured due process and a speedy trial and
sought to circumvent or reduce absurdity, hardships, and injustice. The court
appropriately applied section 31-20A-2.1 of the New Mexico statutes, prohibiting
execution of defendants with mental retardation.

286. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 11, 93 P.3d at 1269 (quoting Cox v. City of Albuquerque, 53 N.M. 334,
340, 207 P.2d 1017, 1021 (1949)).
287. Id.
288. See generally Ellis, Legislative Guide, supra note 72.
289. See generally id.
290. Flores,2004-NMSC-021, 12, 93 P.3d at 1269 (citing State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 238, 880 P.2d
845, 849 (1994) (discussing the additional resources required to try a capital case)); see also Ellis, Legislative
Guide, supra note 72, at 14.
291. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 9H 12-13, 93 P.3d at 1269.
292. See supra notes 272-279 and accompanying text.
293. See generallyAmicus Curiae Brief, Flores(No. 27,845); Ellis, Legislative Guide, supranote 72.
294. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 15, 93 P.3d at 1270 (citing NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1(C) (1991)).
295. See id.TJ 12-13, 93 P.3d at 1270.
296. The court pointed out that, if the statute were read, instead, to restrict the jury from evaluating mental
retardation as a mitigating factor, it would violate the holdings established in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978),
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruled in part by
Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 9116, 93 P.3d at 1270,
297. See generallyEllis, Legislative Guide, supra note 72.
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B. Flores' Application of Apprendi
Apprendi held that factors increasing the penalty of a crime beyond the statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury.298 Although Apprendi did not deal with the
issue of mental retardation, it is still applicable to Flores for the issue of aggravating versus mitigating factors, when they should be decided, and by whom.299
Apprendi established, in the context of a capital case, that a jury must unanimously
reach, beyond a reasonable doubt, the finding that300the defendant "is guilty of every
element of the crime with which he is charged.,
The court in Flores correctly interpreted Apprendi but found that the standard,
"beyond a reasonable doubt," did not apply to the defendant in Floresbecause the
applicable factor sought to reduce the maximum punishment, and thus was not
aggravating. 01 Apprendi specifically addressed aggravating and mitigating factors,
stating that a judge is permitted to reduce the defendant's sentence by way of these
factors because doing so "neither expos[ed] the defendant to a deprivation of liberty
greater than that authorized by the verdict according to statute, nor... impos[ed]
upon the defendant a greater stigma than that accompanying the jury verdict
alone., 30 2 Because the absence of mental retardation did not expose the defendant
in Flores to any greater deprivation of liberty or stigma than the crime itself, the
standard in Apprendi was not appropriate.
The Court's analysis in Ring further clarified the holding in Apprendi. In Ring,
the Court reiterated that a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt aggravating
factors that serve to increase the sentence beyond the statutory maximum. 3 3 Ring
expanded the holding in Apprendi to establish that any aggravating factor that
results in capital punishment must also be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.3" The defendant's argument in Flores was that the absence of mental
retardation results in capital punishment; thus, Ring mandated that the statute be
deemed unconstitutional as written.30 5
Floresappropriately decided that the defendant was incorrect on this point. The
court held that the absence of a mitigating factor is not an aggravating factor.30 6 The
logical interpretation of Ring is that a jury must decide any factor beyond a
reasonable doubt, the absence of which would increase the penalty to death.30 7
Without the presence of mental retardation, the penalty of murder in New Mexico
is not automatically increased to death.30 8 Instead, an aggravating factor must be
found for the sentencer to impose capital punishment in New Mexico's capital

298. See supra Part H.C; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
299. In Flores,the question was whether an absence of mental retardation could be deemed an aggravating
factor because it allowed for the imposition of the death penalty. See Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 93 P.3d 1264.
300. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)).
301. Flores,2004-NMSC-021,1 7, 93 P.3d at 1267.
302. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.16.
303. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
304. Id.
305. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, U 5-6, 93 P.3d at 1267.
306. See id. 7, 93 P.3d at 1267.
307. See generallyEllis, Legislative Guide, supra note 72.
308. See NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1 (1991).
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punishment scheme.3 °9 Without the presence of mental retardation, the trial
continues as it would if the issue were not raised at all.
Therefore, it would have been illogical for the court to have followed the
defendant's reasoning, which would have established the lack of mental retardation
as an aggravating factor. This would have been a dangerous interpretation under a
slippery slope argument: if a lack of mental retardation is an aggravating factor,
then a lack of other mitigating evidence would also be aggravating. For example,
if the defendant's status as a minor were a mitigating factor, the absence of that
factor-the defendant being over the age of eighteen-would thus be an aggravating
factor.
In line with the holding in Apprendi, the court in Floresdetermined that a finding
of mental retardation would not increase the maximum punishment allowed, expose
the defendant to a greater deprivation of liberty, or impose upon the defendant a
greater stigma than a jury verdict would carry.3 1 Instead, the determination of
mental retardation would reduce the maximum sentence allowed and, thus, was a
mitigating factor.3 ' Apprendi explicitly determined that a judicial finding of
aggravating factors that effectually increased a sentence beyond its statutory
maximum was unconstitutional.3" 2 In relying upon the reasoning in both Apprendi
and Ring, the court in Floresappropriately deemed a finding of mental retardation
to be a mitigating factor because a lack of mental retardation did not serve to either
increase the sentence beyond its statutory maximum or to increase the sentence to
that this determination did
death.3" 3 As such, the court inFlorescorrectly confirmed
3 14
not need a jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
C. Flores' Application of Atkins
The Court in Atkins stated that defendants with mental retardation face a special
risk of wrongful execution under the current "evolving standards of decency" and
thus ordered that a defendant with mental retardation should not be subject to the
death penalty." 5 The court in Flores decided, due to silence from the Court in
Atkins, that ajury must be permitted to evaluate mitigating factors.3 16 In doing this,
the court in Flores enforced the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by
mandating that a jury, and not merely a judge, determine a defendant's sentence in
a capital case.

309. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 6,93 P.3d at1267.
310. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 7,93 P.3d at 1267 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at490 n.16).
311. Id.
312. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
313. See Flores,2004-NMSC-021, 8, 93 P.3d at 1267-68.
314. Id. 8, 93 P.3d at 1268; see supra Part IV.D (explaining the alternative route the court in Flores took).
See generallyStreib, supra note 16, at 193-97 (discussing jurisprudence of the death penalty for defendants with
mental retardation).
315. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16, 321; see also supra Part l.D. The notion of "evolving standards of
decency" was expounded upon in Penry, wherein the court stated that "[t]he clearest and most reliable objective
evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures," thus arriving at a national
consensus. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331 (quoting Tropp v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
316. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 14, 93 P.3d at 1269-70. Atkins did not address the issue of whether the
sentencer in a capital case must give effect to mitigating evidence regarding a defendant's character and
background, or the circumstances of the crime.
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Although the court held that a jury must determine mitigating factors at
sentencing, it did not affirm the capital punishment standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt in determining whether a defendant has mental retardation.317 Instead, the
court used the standard specified in section 3 1-20A-2. 1: a preponderance of the
evidence.3" Finding a lack of mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence
potentially lessens the presence of due process because it does not force the jury to
determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant does not have mental
retardation. At first glance, the result may seem incongruous and in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution: a criminal defendant must be found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime alleged, but a lack of mental retardation, in
the same trial, does not need to be found beyond a reasonable doubt. This may
appear troubling because a lack of mental retardation allows the sentencer to impose
the death penalty. Yet, the lack of mental retardation does not actually increase the
sentence beyond the statutory maximum nor to death. Rather, finding a lack of
mental retardation merely allows the trial to proceed as though the issue had not
been raised. Therefore, it does not need to be found beyond a reasonable doubt forthe U.S. Constitution to be satisfied.3" 9
The court in Flores further stated that the post-Atkins, "mitigating significance"
of ajury's finding of mental retardation in a defendant must be conclusive.32 ° Thus,
the court verified that, consistent with Atkins, ajury determination that a defendant
" ' The court in Flores approis mentally retarded necessarily precludes death.32
priately followed the standard set forth in Atkins, establishing that any finding that
a defendant has mental retardation prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.322
Further, the court appropriately translated the silence in Atkins regarding the Penry
rule that a jury must be permitted to consider mental retardation as a mitigating
factor at sentencing.323
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The court in
addressed New Mexico's process in dealing with
a capital defendant with mental retardation. What Flores did not discuss were
thoughts of how the State, the legislature, and the courts will address similar
issues-for example, schizophrenia-as well as how the lower courts will respond
to the procedural mandates laid out in Flores.
State v. Flores3 24

A. Lower Courts'Applicationof the Definition of Mental Retardation
One concern arising from Floresis how the lower courts will apply the definition
of mental retardation as laid out in the statute. The court in Floresdid not discuss
the definition of mental retardation, other than to simply state It. Other..j

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

See id. 1 19, 93 P.3d at 1271.
NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1(C) (1991).
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Flores,2004-NMSC-021, 17, 93 P.3d at 1270-71 (quoting NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2. 1(C) (1991)).
Id. 11, 93 P.3dat 1265.
Id.
Id. 1 3, 93 P.3d at 1266.
2004-NMSC-021, 93 P.3d 1264.
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3 25
have been concerned about district courts applying the definition too strictly.
Mostjurisdictions have adopted the American Association on Mental Retardation's
(AAMR) 1992 definition326 of "mental retardation."32' 7 Although the 1992 definition
does not impose a strict intelligence quotient (IQ), it is convenient and simple to
impose one. As mental retardation generally encompasses individuals with an IQ
score of 70 or below, that tends to be the number used in statutes and, indeed, is the
number used in New Mexico's statute.328
It would be easy for trial courts to simply apply the standard IQ cut-off of 70 or
below. But basing sentencing on IQ alone is not a sufficient guarantee that defendants without a particular level of culpability would not be unconstitutionally
subject to the death penalty, which is precisely whatAtkins sought to protect. Statutory definitions of mental retardation do not list only the IQ requirement; they also
implement other standards.3 29 Given the intent of the Court in Atkins to protect less
culpable defendants from execution,"' it would be a disservice to the Supreme
Court to ignore the nuances of the definition of mental retardation and simply apply
the standard IQ. Although this has not yet appeared in New Mexico jurisprudence,
it may arise in the future. Legal professionals in this jurisdiction should adjust the
applicable legislation to remove the number listed and to update the law with the
revised AAMR definition.33'

B. Legislative Response
It is the job of the legislature to enact lawsT3 2 and to decide on substantive issues,
and it is the job of the judiciary to interpret the law.333 Although the legislature
created the law at issue 334 and addressed the substantive issue of executing
defendants with mental retardation, the court in Flores took it a step further by
implementing constitutional safeguards for defendants with mental retardation.335
Although the legislature did not explicitly address the question of when the judicial
determination of a hearing on the question of mental retardation should occur, the
court in Flores deemed that a pretrial hearing was satisfactory under the statute.336

325. See, e.g., Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2004).
326. The AAMR definition from 1992 is no longer the most current. The AAMR revised the definition in
2002 to refine the portion relating to adaptive skills. See AAMR, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 1 (10th ed. 2002).
327. See supra note 72.
328. NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2. I(A) (1991); see also Ellis, Legislative Guide, supra note 72, at 13; Howell,
151 S.W.3d at 453-59; Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 568 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13203(a) (2003); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130(2) (Banks-Baldwin 2003).
329. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(a) (2003). For a recent
case addressing the issue of mental retardation and the intelligence quotient requirement in a California statute,
see In re Hawthorne, 105 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2005), and the related statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (West Supp.
2005).
330. 536 U.S. 304, 315-16 (2002).
331. AAMR, supra note 326.
332.

U.S. CONST. art. 1.

333.
334.
335.
336.

Id.
NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2.1 (1991).
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part I.B.
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The legislature may not have intended this result. As discussed above,337 the
silence in the sentencing statute (versus the explicit statement in the competency
statute338) could indicate that the legislature did not want this hearing to occur
pretrial. If the legislature had wanted that result, it could have written that into the
statute. As there is minimal legislative history in New Mexico, we do not know if
this was an intentional or unintentional omission. However, if it was the legislature's intent to have left this portion out, the legislature may correct the court's
holding by enacting an amendment stating that a hearing on the defendant's mental
retardation shall occur after the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. As discussed
above, however,
it is unlikely, given the policy considerations, that the legislature
33 9
SO.
do
will
C. Other Mental Deficiencies
An issue that will likely come before New Mexico courts is the question of
capital punishment for defendants with other serious mental limitations or
illnesses.34 The U.S. Supreme Court has decided that defendants with mental
retardation may not be executed.34 ' The New Mexico legislature may find it
appropriate to again create a statute at the forefront of the legal field that addresses
other mental deficiencies including cognitive disorders acquired post-childhood
(such as a debilitating car accident),342 schizophrenia,343 and low CNS Serotonin
Function," to name a few. Although defendants with these limitations may have
the opportunity to present them as mitigating evidence at trial, it is illogical that
they should not receive the same categorical exemption that defendants with mental
retardation now receive. The cases may slowly find their way to the Supreme Court
as they arise, but in the meantime, the New Mexican legal community ought to
explicitly and presently address the issue through statutory enactment.
VII. CONCLUSION
New Mexico was one of the first states to implement a statute that prohibited the
execution of defendants with mental retardation. This state should continue to be
at the forefront of legal action and prohibit the execution, as a class, of defendants
who have mental limitations other than mental retardation or insanity 45 (and not
just give mitigating effect to these issues to be weighed in the sentencing phase of

337. See supra notes 285-293 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 285-293 and accompanying text.
339. See sunra Part V.A: Ellis, Legislative Guide, supra note 72.
340. The Supreme Court decided in Fordv. Wainwright,477 U.S. 399 (1986), that execution of defendants
who are "insane" is not permissible under the Constitution. Id. at 410. However, the Court has not yet addressed
all of the mental deficiencies that can and will arise and that logically deserve the same interpretation the defendant
in Atkins received. See generally Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33 N.M.
L. REV. 255 (2003).
341. Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
342. Most definitions of mental retardation require onset before the age of eighteen. Ellis, Legislative Guide,
supra note 72, at 13.
343. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, DSM-

IV-TR 298-312 (4th ed. 2000).
344. See Mossman, supra note 340, at 279-87.
345. "Insanity" is a legal term, not an illness.
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the trial). Further, legal professionals in New Mexico should start looking towards
broadening the definition of mental retardation for application in the lower courts.
The newest definition available should be implemented as it is the definition most
likely to accurately reflect the complex workings of the human mind.346

346. On November 24, 2004, just a few months after the court decided Flores,Assistant District Attorney
Ronald Walker filed a one-paragraph notice in state district court in Lovington, New Mexico expressing his intent
to no longer seek the death penalty in State v. Flores.Walker explained his actions as merely a desire to get the case
to trial as soon as possible. Rene Romo, Hobbs Man Won't FaceDeath, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 3, 2004.

